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Lying is typically more cognitively demanding than truth telling. Yet, recent cognitive
models of lying propose that lying can be just as easy as truth telling, depending on
contextual factors. In line with this idea, research has shown that the cognitive cost
of deception decreases when people frequently respond deceptively, while it increases
when people rarely respond deceptively (i.e., the truth proportion effect). In the present
study, we investigated two possible underlying mechanisms of the truth proportion effect.
In Experiment 1 (N = 121), we controlled for the impact of switch costs by keeping
the number of switches between deceptive and truthful responses constant. We found
that people who often responded deceptively made fewer errors when responding
deceptively than people who only occasionally responded deceptively, replicating the
truth proportion effect. Thus, while the truth proportion effect in earlier studies may be
partially driven by the cost of switching between truthful and deceptive responses, we
still found evidence for the truth proportion effect while controlling for switch costs. In
Experiment 2 (N = 68), we assessed whether the truth proportion effect is influenced
by goal neglect. According to this view, the truth proportion effect should be reduced
if participants are cued to maintain the task goals, while it should be larger when
participants are allowed to neglect the task goals. In line with this hypothesis, we found a
smaller truth proportion effect when participants were cued with the task goals compared
to when they were not cued. This study shows that the truth proportion effect is influenced
by goal neglect, implying that frequent deceptive responding strengthens the goal of
responding deceptively. Our findings imply that the accuracy of lie detection tests could
be increased by using a majority of truth-items (i.e., induce the truth proportion effect),
and that the truth proportion effect should be maximized by (1) increasing the number of
truth-lie task switches and (2) inducing goal neglect.
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INTRODUCTION
Lying is commonly defined as “[making] an untrue statement
with intent to deceive” (Lie, 2015). Deliberate and successful
lying is generally considered to be more difficult than telling the
truth. Cognitive models posit that lying requires more cognitive
resources than truth telling (Gombos, 2006; Vrij et al., 2006,
2011; Blandón-Gitlin et al., 2014). These additional resources are
needed—among other things—to suppress the truth, to monitor
the behavior of the listener, and to fabricate and if necessary adapt
the story. Several neuro-imaging studies have provided evidence
in line with this idea, showing increased activation in prefrontal
brain regions involved in cognitive control during deception
(e.g., Christ et al., 2009; Farah et al., 2014; Gamer, 2014). It has
been argued that this cognitive cost of lying is invariable (e.g.,
Johnson et al., 2005), implying that cognitive lie detection tests
should be well able to differentiate between liars and truth-tellers.
However, recent theories propose that lying is not always more
difficult than telling the truth, suggesting that the cognitive cost of
lying becomes larger or smaller depending on contextual factors,
and thus that cognitive lie detection tests should take these factors
into account (e.g., see Walczyk et al., 2013).
According to the Information Manipulation Theory II
(McCornack et al., 2014), lying does not always require more
cognitive resources than truth telling (see also Vrij, 2015).
Depending on contextual factors and how readily information
can be retrieved from memory, both lying and truth telling
can be cognitively demanding or relatively easy. Lying will
be more difficult than truth telling when for instance the
truth is easily accessed in memory, or when constructing a lie
involves the retrieval of information from long-term memory.
When such conditions are reversed, lying may be easier than
telling the truth. The theory further specifies that people who
often attain their goals through lying will be more likely to
continue to lie. For these people, lying is thought to be efficient,
well-practiced, and therefore—in some cases—cognitively less
demanding than telling the truth. A similar view on lying is
also presented in the Activation-Decision-Construction-Action
Theory (ADCAT; Walczyk et al., 2014). These authors specify a
number of conditions under which lying is likely more difficult
than truth telling, such as high motivation, or anxiety of the
liar, or telling complex, unfamiliar, or unrehearsed lies. ADCAT
therefore predicts that lying may be cognitively less demanding
than truth telling when a lie is simple or when a lie is extensively
prepared or rehearsed.
In experimental studies, the cognitive cost of lying is typically
investigated using deception paradigms, in which participants
are required to respond either truthfully or deceptively to
relatively simple statements by pressing appropriate response
buttons1. The results of two early studies were not in line
with the idea that responding deceptively may be as demanding
as responding truthfully. Johnson et al. (2005) found that
1It is important to note here that these deception paradigms do not involve the
actual production of deceptive messages in a communication context. Although
they do cover important aspects of lying (i.e., giving responses participants know
to be false), they do not capture the full complexity of lying and thus represent only
simplified and limited laboratory approximations of lying.
practice in deceptive responding influenced neither behavioral
nor neurological measures of cognitive control. In a study of
Vendemia et al. (2005), the reaction time data revealed no
practice effect on the cognitive cost of responding deceptively,
although the error data did show that the cognitive cost of
deceptive responding diminished following practice.
More recent experimental evidence is more in line with the
idea that the cognitive cost of deception can be reduced through
practice. Verschuere et al. (2011) used a Sheffield lie test (Spence
et al., 2001) to assess the cognitive cost of deception. In this task,
participants are presented brief YES–NO questions (e.g., Did
you buy a newspaper today?), and they are required to respond
truthfully or deceptively depending on cues (e.g., the color of
the statements). The cognitive cost of deception is inferred from
the difference in reaction times and error rates between lie-trials
and truth-trials, and it has been repeatedly found that deceptive
responses are typically slower andmore error-prone than truthful
responses (Verschuere et al., 2014). In order to address the
effect of frequent deception on the cognitive cost of deception,
Verschuere et al. manipulated the proportion of lie/truth-trials
across participants. In a frequent-lie group, participants were
required to respond deceptively on 75% of the trials and
to respond truthfully on only 25% of the trials. Inversely,
participants in a frequent-truth group responded truthfully on
75% of the trials and responded deceptively on only 25% of the
trials. They found that participants in a control group with a
lie/truth ratio of 50/50 were slower and made more errors on lie-
trials than on truth-trials (i.e., the so-called lie-effect), reflecting
that responding deceptively is cognitively more demanding than
responding truthfully. More crucially though, this lie-effect was
further enhanced in the frequent-truth group and it was reduced
to near zero in the frequent-lie group. We refer to this effect
as the truth proportion effect (in analogy to the proportion
congruency effect; see Schmidt, 2013), because it reflects that
responding deceptively becomes even more difficult when people
only seldom do so, and responding deceptively becomes just as
easy or difficult as responding truthfully when people frequently
give deceptive responses. The results of Verschuere et al. were
later replicated by Van Bockstaele et al. (2012), who showed that
trained deceptive responses remained as easy or difficult as the
truthful responses, even when the ratio of lie/truth-trials was set
back to 50/50 after the training. Finally, Hu et al. (2012) found
a near zero difference between truthful and deceptive responses
in both error rates and reaction times in participants who were
trained to respond deceptively, while the lie-effect was left intact
in untrained participants.
Although there is evidence for the idea that the cognitive cost
of deception can be influenced by manipulating the proportion
of truth-trials, the underlying mechanism of the truth proportion
effect is poorly understood. A thorough understanding of the
mechanisms behind the truth proportion effect is imperative, as
this would allow researchers to map the boundary conditions of
cognition-based lie detection as well as improve the accuracy of
cognitive lie detection tests. One mechanism that can account
for the truth proportion effect is based on task switching (e.g.,
see Monsell, 2003; Vandierendonck et al., 2010). In a context
where participants’ specific tasks can vary on a trial-by-trial basis,
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performance on trial N depends on the task that participants
performed in the preceding trial N-1. Performance on trial N is
usually better (i.e., faster reaction times and less errors) when
trials N and N-1 require participants to perform the same task
(repetition trials), while it is usually worse when trials N and
N-1 require the participant to perform different tasks (switch
trials). The difference in performance between task repetition
trials and task switch trials is referred to as switch cost. In the
studies of Verschuere et al. (2011) and Van Bockstaele et al.
(2012), participants were required to switch between responding
deceptively and responding truthfully. For the frequent-lie group,
truth-trials were relatively rare, making them more likely to be
preceded by a lie-trial than a truth-trial (e.g., Lie-Lie-Truth-Lie-
Lie). Truth-trials were therefore more likely to involve a task
switch, whereas lie-trials more likely involved a task repetition.
Conversely, in the frequent-truth group, truth-trials were more
likely task repetitions and lie-trials were more likely switch
trials (e.g., Truth-Truth-Truth-Lie-Truth). As such, different
distributions of task switch costs over lie- and truth-trials may
have increased the lie-effect in the frequent-truth group, and
reduced it in the frequent-lie group.
Another possibility is that the truth proportion effect is driven
by goal neglect (Duncan, 1995). According to the goal neglect
theory, task goals guide the selection of appropriate responses,
especially in tasks that require high levels of cognitive control.
Fast and accurate responses are driven by more active task goals,
while slower and more erroneous responses occur when the
necessary task goals are neglected. For instance, in the Stroop
task (Stroop, 1935), participants are required to respond to
the ink color of color words while ignoring the meaning of
the word. Typically, people are faster to respond to congruent
trials, in which the ink color matches the meaning of the word
(e.g., “BLUE” in blue ink), compared to incongruent trials, in
which the ink color and the meaning of the word mismatch
(“BLUE” in green ink). De Jong et al. (1999) manipulated goal
neglect vs. goal maintenance in a Stroop task by using long vs.
short response-stimulus intervals (RSIs). They argued that long
RSIs would lead to lapses in attention and decreased inhibition,
thus promoting goal neglect, while short RSIs would improve
attentional focus and the capacity to inhibit the meaning of
the words, thus promoting goal maintenance. In line with their
hypothesis, they found that the Stroop effect was smaller at short
RSIs compared to long RSIs. Previous research has shown that
the overall cognitive cost of deception is influenced by goal
neglect. Debey et al. (2012) found that lie-effects increased when
participants were manipulated to neglect task goals compared to
when they remained focused on the task goals. In the studies
of Verschuere et al. (2011) and Van Bockstaele et al. (2012),
the manipulation of the truth proportion may have induced
different goals in the frequent-lie and frequent-truth groups.
When participants were required to respond deceptively on
most of the trials, responding deceptively was likely the most
active task goal. As such, participants in the frequent-lie groups
were more likely to respond fast and accurately on lie-trials
rather than truth-trials, thus decreasing the size of the lie-effect.
Inversely, when participants responded truthfully on most of the
trials, responding truthfully was likely the most active task goal.
Participants in the frequent-truth groups may therefore have
been more likely to respond fast and accurately on truth-trials
rather than lie-trials, resulting in an increased lie-effect.
In the present study, we experimentally addressed the role
of these two possible underlying mechanisms (i.e., switch costs
and/or goal neglect) of the truth proportion effect. If the
truth proportion effect is driven by either (or both) of these
mechanisms, this knowledge could be used to maximize the
difference between deceptive and truthful responses in cognitive
lie-detection tests. In both experiments, we manipulated the
proportion of lie-trials and truth-trials between subjects, thus
creating a frequent-lie group, a frequent-truth group, and a
control group (similar to Van Bockstaele et al., 2012 and
Verschuere et al., 2011). In Experiment 1, we controlled for the
possible influence of switch costs by creating sequences of crucial
trials in which lie-trials and truth-trials alternated consistently.
These sequences of trials were alternated with sequences of only
lie-trials (frequent-lie group), only truth-trials (frequent-truth
group), or alternating lie- and truth-trials (control group). If
the truth proportion effect is not driven by switch costs, we
expected to replicate our previous findings (Verschuere et al.,
2011; Van Bockstaele et al., 2012), whereas the truth proportion
effect should disappear when it is driven by switch costs. In
Experiment 2, we manipulated goal maintenance by adding an
informative cue on half of the trials (e.g., see Parris et al., 2012).
This cue indicated whether the following trial would be a lie-
trial or a truth-trial. We expected that these cues would reinstate
the presumed neglected goal (i.e., responding truthfully in the
frequent-lie group and responding deceptively in the frequent-
truth group), hence reducing the truth proportion effect.
EXPERIMENT 1
Methods
Participants
One hundred and thirty students participated in this experiment
in exchange for course credits. The entire experiment took about
20min. All participants were informed about the general nature
of the tasks and signed the informed consent form before the
start of the experiment. The study was approved by the ethical
committee of the department of psychology of the University of
Amsterdam.
Sheffield Lie Test
The Sheffield Lie Test consisted of a practice phase (60 trials)
and a test phase (160 trials). The goal of the practice phase was
to clarify the task instructions and get participants acquainted
with the task. For this purpose, we used six questions related to
general knowledge (e.g., “Is London in Germany?”, see Appendix
1 for all questions used in Experiment 1). Half of these questions
required a YES response (pressing the “4” key on a normal
keyboard), while the other half required a NO response (pressing
the “6” key). The YES–NO response labels always remained on
the screen according to the response mapping. Depending on
the color of these response labels (yellow or blue), participants
were required to respond truthfully or deceptively as quickly
and as accurately as possible. The meaning of the colors (lie
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vs. truth) was counterbalanced across participants. In a first
part of the practice phase, the six questions were presented
twice. Participants were required to give truthful YES-responses
in the first 3 trials, followed by 3 truthful NO-responses, 3
deceptive YES-responses, and 3 deceptive NO-responses. In the
following 12 trials, 6 lie-trials and 6 truth-trials were presented
randomly. The inter-trial interval (ITI) in these first 24 trials
varied randomly between 1500, 2000, and 2500ms. In the last
36 practice trials, 18 lie- and 18 truth-trials were presented
randomly, and the ITI varied between 500, 1000, and 1500ms.
Throughout the entire practice phase, feedback was given on
both correct and incorrect responses, and there was no response
deadline.
In the test block, we used 40 autobiographical questions (e.g.,
“Do you live in the Netherlands?”). Half of these questions was
repeated 4 times in filler trials, while the other half was repeated
4 times in test trials. In total, the test block consisted of 160 trials:
80 filler trials and 80 test trials. The use of the question sets in
either filler or test trials was counterbalanced across participants.
The filler trials were used to create 3 groups of participants
that differed in their frequency of deceptive responding. In the
frequent-lie group, all filler trials required a deceptive response,
while in the frequent-truth group, all filler trials required a
truthful response. For the filler trials in the control group, we
wanted to present 40 lie-trials and 40 truth-trials. However, due
to a small programming error, we presented 43 lie-trials and
37 truth-trials. In all 3 groups, the test trials consisted of 40
lie-trials and 40 truth-trials. Hence, out of a total of 160 trials,
participants in the frequent-lie group were required to respond
deceptively on 120 trials (75%), participants in the frequent-truth
group responded deceptively on 40 trials (25%), and participants
in the control group responded deceptively on 83 trials (52%).
Filler and test trials were presented in alternating sequences of 10
trials (i.e., 10 filler trials, 10 test trials, 10 filler trials, 10 test trials,
and so on). In order to control for switch costs, each sequence of
test trials in all 3 groups consisted of 5 lie-trials and 5 truth-trials
in alternating order (i.e., lie-truth-lie-truth-etc.). The ITI varied
randomly between 500, 1000, and 1500ms, and all trials had a
response deadline of 3000ms. No feedback was given in the test
phase. The entire task was programmed using Inquisit 3 (2010),
and it was run on a standard Windows computer.
Results
Data Preparation and Outliers
First, we discarded the data of the practice phase. Trials with
responses faster than 300ms (0.7%) and equal to 3000ms
(response deadline: 2.0%) were removed. Next, we calculated the
overall error rate in the entire block as well as the error rate
for filler and test trials separately. Based on these error rates, we
removed participants who made too many errors and were likely
not complying with the task instructions. Participants who made
more than 30% errors in total (N = 8) or more than 40% errors
on test trials (N = 1) were removed from the data, resulting in
a final sample of 121 participants. For the analysis of the error
rates, we then removed the filler trials as well as the first trial in
each test trial sequence, because these first switch trials after long
repetition sequences are likely to result in abnormally high switch
TABLE 1 | Errors and reaction times in Experiment 1.
Frequent-lie Control Frequent-truth
(N = 38) (N = 40) (N = 43)
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
Errors (%) Lie 16.45 (8.72) 17.56 (9.44) 22.35 (10.17)
Truth 14.91 (10.01) 13.66 (8.09) 15.12 (8.86)
Lie effect 1.54 (9.42) 3.90 (7.48) 7.23 (8.09)
RTs (ms) Lie 1499 (249) 1520 (258) 1389 (213)
Truth 1411 (246) 1426 (224) 1332 (199)
Lie effect 88 (136) 95 (125) 57 (132)
costs. Finally, we calculated the error rate for lie- and truth-trials
separately. For the RT analyses, we first removed trials with errors
(16.0%). Next, we removed all trials with RTs deviatingmore than
3 SDs from the overall average group RT (M = 1342ms, SD =
474, removal of 0.8% of the remaining data), as well as trials with
RTs deviating more than 3 SDs from each individual’s average RT
(0.8%). Finally, we removed the filler trials and the first trial of
each test trial sequence, and we calculated mean RTs for lie- and
truth-trials.
Error Rates
We subjected the error rates to a 2 (Deception: lie vs. truth) ×
3 (Group: frequent-lie vs. control vs. frequent-truth) repeated
measures ANOVA, with Deception as a within-subjects factor
and Group as a between-subjects factor. This analysis yielded
a significant main effect of Deception, F(1, 118) = 30.95, p =
0.000, f = 0.51, indicating that participants made more errors
on lie-trials (M = 18.91%, SE = 0.89) than on truth trials
(M = 14.57%, SE = 0.81), and a significant interaction between
Deception and Group, F(2, 118) = 4.78, p = 0.01, f = 0.28
(see Table 1)2. The main effect of Group was not significant,
F(2, 118) = 1.94, p = 0.15. To follow up on the significant
interaction, we calculated lie-effect scores by subtracting the error
rate for truth-trials from the error rate for lie-trials. Between-
group comparisons revealed a larger lie-effect in the frequent-
truth group compared to the frequent-lie group, F(1, 79) = 8.56,
p = 0.004, d = 0.63, and a marginally larger lie-effect in the
frequent-truth group compared to the control group, F(1, 81) =
3.77, p = 0.06, d = 0.41. There was no significant difference
between the frequent-lie group and the control group, F(1, 76) =
1.51, p = 0.22, d = 0.28. The difference between lie- and
truth-trials was significant in the control group, F(1, 39) = 10.88,
p = 0.002, f = 0.53, and the frequent-truth group, F(1, 42) =
34.37, p = 0.000, f = 0.90, but not in the frequent-lie group,
F(1, 37) = 1.02, p = 0.32, f = 0.17. As such, these results suggest
2Effect sizes for between-group contrasts were estimated with Cohen’s d.
According to Cohen (1992), values from 0.20 represent small effects, values from
0.50 represent medium effects and values of 0.80 and larger represent large
effects. Effect sizes for within-subjects effects and interactions were estimated
using Cohen’s f, with values from 0.10 representing small effects, values from 0.25
representing medium effects and values from 0.40 representing large effects. We
calculated f using the following formula: f = √[η2p/(1− η2p)].
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that the truth proportion effect is still apparent when switch costs
are kept constant across groups.
Reaction Times
A similar 2 (Deception)× 3 (Group) repeated measures ANOVA
on the RT data revealed a significant main effect of Deception,
F(1, 118) = 44.86, p = 0.000, f = 0.62, indicating that participants
responded slower on lie-trials (M = 1467ms, SE = 22) than
on truth-trials (M = 1387ms, SE = 20). The main effect of
Group was also significant, F(2, 118) = 3.10, p = 0.05. Between-
group comparisons showed that participants in the frequent-
truth group (M = 1360ms, SE = 30) were faster than
participants in the control group (M = 1473ms, SE = 37),
F(1, 81) = 5.72, p = 0.02, and marginally faster than participants
in the frequent-lie group (M = 1455ms, SE = 39), F(1, 79) =
3.88, p = 0.05, with no difference between the control group
and the frequent-lie group, F < 1. The crucial interaction was
not significant, F < 1, indicating that the truth proportion effect
was not present in the RT data when the effects of task switching
were controlled for (seeTable 1). In other words, the standard lie-
effect was present in all 3 groups [frequent-lie group: F(1, 37) =
15.97, p = 0.000, f = 0.66; control group: F(1, 39) = 22.76,
p = 0.000, f = 0.76; frequent-truth group: F(1, 42) = 8.03,
p = 0.007, f = 0.44], but there was no difference between the
3 groups. In sum, the RT data suggest that the truth proportion
effect is to a certain degree dependent upon switch costs.
Discussion
In Experiment 1, we kept the number of switches on lie- and
truth-trials equal to investigate whether the previously reported
truth proportion effect was driven by differences in switch costs.
If this were the case, we expected that the truth proportion
effect would disappear, whereas we expected to replicate the truth
proportion effect if it is not driven by switch costs. Our results
show that there was no sign of a truth proportion effect in the RT
data, with all groups showing similar increased RTs on lie-trials
relative to truth-trials. In contrast, the error data did still reveal
a truth proportion effect, as illustrated by the larger lie-effect in
the frequent-truth group relative to the frequent-lie group, and a
similar tendency when comparing the frequent-truth group, and
the control group. Hence, the RT data indicate that the truth
proportion effect is to a certain degree driven by switch costs,
but the largely intact truth proportion effect in the error data
suggests that differences in switch costs are likely not the only
phenomenon that contributes to the truth proportion effect.
EXPERIMENT 2
Methods
Participants
Seventy-two students participated in this experiment in exchange
for either course credits or e3.5. The entire experiment took
about 20min. All participants were informed about the general
nature of the tasks and signed the informed consent form before
the start of the experiment. The study was approved by the ethical
committee of the department of psychology of the University of
Amsterdam
Sheffield Lie Test
The overall appearance of the Sheffield Lie Test was identical to
the test used in Experiment 1. The test consisted of two practice
blocks and one test block. In the practice blocks, we used 12
questions about semantic knowledge (e.g., “Is there water in the
sea?”, see Appendix 2 for all questions used in Experiment 2), 6
of which required YES-responses and 6 required NO-responses.
The first practice block consisted of 3 truthful YES-responses,
followed by 3 deceptive NO-responses, 3 truthful NO-responses,
and 3 deceptive YES-responses. The second test block consisted
of 24 trials (6 deceptive YES, 6 deceptive NO, 6 truthful YES,
and 6 truthful NO), presented in random order. In both practice
blocks, feedback was given on correct and incorrect responses,
and the ITI was 0ms.
In the test block, we used a new set of 36 semantic YES-
NO questions. Each question was presented 8 times: 4 times in
filler trials and 4 times in test trials, for a total of 288 trials.
The filler trials consisted of all lie-trials (frequent-lie group), all
truth-trials (frequent-truth group), or 50% lie- and 50% truth-
trials (control group). The test trials consisted for all 3 groups
of 50% lie- and 50% truth-trials. As such, 75% of the trials in
the frequent-lie group were lie-trials, compared to 50% in the
control group and 25% in the frequent-truth group. In order to
manipulate goal maintenance, half of the filler and test trials were
preceded by an informative cue that was presented for 1 s in the
center of the screen prior to the presentation of the question.
The cue was either “LIE” or “TRUTH,” and always correctly
indicated which action participants would have to perform on
the following trial. The other half of all trials (filler and test trials)
were not cued, and merely showed a fixation cross for 1 s. The
ITI was 0ms. There was no response deadline and no feedback
was given in the test phase. The entire task was programmed
using Inquisit 3 (2010), and it was run on a standard Windows
computer.
Results
Data Preparation and Outliers
First, we discarded the data of the practice phase. Trials with
responses faster than 300ms (guesses: 0.8%) were removed. Next,
we calculated the overall error rate in the entire block as well
as the error rate for filler and test trials separately. Participants
who made more than 30% errors in total (N = 4) or more
than 40% errors on test trials (N = 0) were removed from the
data. For the analysis of the error rates, we then selected the test
trials and calculated the error rate for lie- and truth-trials, for
cued and non-cued trials separately. For the RT analyses, we first
removed trials with errors (10.9%). Next, we removed all trials
with RTs deviating more than 3 SDs from the mean group RT
(M = 1615ms, SD = 1256, removal of 1.2% of the remaining
data), as well as trials with RTs deviating more than 3 SDs from
each individual’s average RT (1.9%). Finally, we removed the filler
trials, and we calculated mean RTs for lie- and truth-trials for
cued and non-cued trials.
Errors
We conducted a 2 (Deception: lie vs. truth) × 2 (Cue:
cued vs. non-cued) × 3 (Group: frequent-lie vs. control
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vs. frequent-truth) repeated measures ANOVA on the error
percentages, with Deception and Cue as within-subjects factors
and Group as a between-subjects factor. This analysis revealed
main effects of Deception, F(1, 65) = 31.87, p = 0.000, f = 0.70,
and Cue, F(1, 65) = 10.71, p = 0.002, f = 0.41. Overall,
participants made more errors on lie-trials (M = 10.95, SE =
0.73) than on truth-trials (M = 7.20, SE = 0.56, and they made
less errors on cued trials (M = 8.10, SE = 0.58) than on non-
cued trials (M = 10.05, SE = 0.65). The interaction between
Deception and Group was also significant, F(2, 65) = 9.18, p =
0.000, f = 0.53, reflecting the original truth proportion effect. To
follow up on the Deception by Group interaction, we calculated
lie-effect scores by subtracting the error percentage on truth-
trials from the error percentage on lie-trials (irrespective of Cue).
Between-group comparisons showed that the overall lie-effect
was larger in the frequent-truth group (M = 7.28, SD = 6.93)
than in the frequent-lie group (M = 0.73, SD = 3.70) and
the control group (M = 2.83, SD = 4.45), F(1, 43) = 15.03,
p = 0.000, d = 1.18, and F(1, 45) = 6.81, p = 0.01, d = 0.76,
respectively. The frequent-lie group did not differ significantly
from the control group, F(1, 42) = 2.88, p = 0.10, d = 0.52.
This overall lie-effect (irrespective of Cue) was significant in the
control group, F(1, 22) = 9.47, p = 0.006, and the frequent-truth
group, F(1, 23) = 26.61, p = 0.000, but not in the frequent-
lie group, F < 1, p = 0.38. The crucial Three-way interaction
between Cue, Deception, and Group was not significant (see
Table 2), F(2, 65) = 1.97, p = 0.15, f = 0.25, nor were any other
effects, all Fs< 1. Exploratory between-group comparisons of the
lie-effect scores for cued and non-cued trials separately revealed
no group differences on cued trials, all Fs < 2.10, all ps > 0.15.
For non-cued trials, the lie-effect was larger in the frequent-truth
group compared to both the control group and the frequent-lie
group, both Fs> 6.38, both ps< 0.05, with no difference between
the control group and the frequent-lie group, F(1, 42) = 2.61,
p = 0.11.
Reaction Times
As for the error rates, we used a 2 (Deception) × 2 (Cue)
× 3 (Group) repeated measures ANOVA on the reaction time
data. This analysis revealed significant main effects of Deception,
F(1, 65) = 76.70, p = 0.000, f = 1.09, with faster RTs on truth-
trials (M = 1410, SE = 38) compared to lie-trials (M = 1577,
SE = 39), and Cue, F(1, 65) = 55.56, p = 0.000, f = 0.92, with
faster RTs on cued trials (M = 1449, SE = 38) than on non-cued
trials (M = 1539, SE = 38), as well as a significant interaction
between Deception and Group, F(2, 65) = 4.00, p = 0.02, f =
0.35. The main effect of Group was only marginally significant,
F(2, 65) = 2.72, p = 0.07, and the interactions between Cue
and Group and between Deception and Cue were not significant,
both Fs< 1. Crucially, the Three-way interaction betweenGroup,
Deception, and Cue was significant, F(2, 65) = 12.70, p = 0.000,
f = 0.63 (see Table 2). To follow up on this interaction, we
calculated lie-effect scores by subtracting RTs on truth-trials from
RTs on lie-trials for cued and non-cued trials separately. There
were no differences in lie-effects between the groups on cued
trials, F < 1, and the lie-effect was present in all 3 groups
(frequent-lie group: F(1, 20) = 16.58, p = 0.001, f = 0.91;
TABLE 2 | Errors and reaction times on cued and non-cued trials in
Experiment 2.
Frequent-lie Control Frequent-truth
(N = 21) (N = 23) (N = 24)
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
Errors (%) cued Lie 9.28 (6.30) 8.28 (5.25) 11.45 (7.74)
Truth 7.48 (6.75) 5.64 (5.56) 6.44 (4.55)
Lie effect 1.80 (6.18) 2.64 (7.78) 5.00 (8.35)
Errors (%) non-cued Lie 9.63 (5.43) 10.85 (6.31) 15.70 (9.82)
Truth 9.99 (5.81) 7.82 (6.64) 6.18 (4.66)
Lie effect −0.36 (5.79) 3.03 (7.87) 9.52 (9.60)
RTs (ms) cued Lie 1598 (379) 1587 (280) 1399 (302)
Truth 1432 (354) 1426 (308) 1272 (287)
Lie effect 166 (187) 161 (156) 126 (219)
RTs (ms) non-cued Lie 1607 (385) 1705 (281) 1578 (351)
Truth 1590 (337) 1508 (286) 1267 (271)
Lie effect 16 (201) 197 (154) 311 (208)
control group: F(1, 22) = 24.51, p = 0.000, f = 1.06; frequent-
truth group: F(1, 23) = 7.98, p = 0.01, f = 0.59). On non-
cued trials, the group difference was significant, F(2, 65) = 13.74,
p = 0.000. Between-group comparisons revealed larger lie-effects
in the frequent-truth group compared to both the control group,
F(1, 45) = 4.55, p = 0.04, d = 0.62, and the frequent-lie group,
F(1, 43) = 23.23, p = 0.000, d = 1.44, and a larger lie-effect in the
control group than in the frequent-lie group, F(1, 42) = 11.31,
p = 0.002, d = 1.01. The lie-effect on non-cued trials was
present in the control group, F(1, 22) = 37.71, p = 0.000, f =
1.31, and the frequent-truth group F(1, 23) = 53.79, p = 0.000,
f = 1.53, but not in the frequent-lie group, F < 1, p = 0.71,
f = 0.08. These results clearly indicate that the truth proportion
effect disappeared on cued trials but is replicated on non-cued
trials. In other words, the truth-proportion effect disappeared
when participants were encouraged to maintain their task goals,
illustrating that the original truth proportion effect is at least in
part caused by goal neglect.
Discussion
In Experiment 2, we manipulated goal maintenance and goal
neglect by presenting cues that either had information value
with regard to the upcoming task (responding truthfully vs.
responding deceptively) or had no information value (a fixation
cross). The RT data revealed that the truth proportion effect
vanishes when participants are cued with the relevant task goal.
When no such cue was presented we replicated the original truth
proportion effect, finding a large lie-effect in the frequent-truth
group, a medium lie-effect in the control group, and a near
zero lie-effect in the frequent-lie group. This finding was only
partially reflected in the error data, where the crucial Three-
way interaction failed to reach significance. However, even in the
error data there was a tendency for the truth proportion effect to
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be reduced when the correct task goals were cued. As such, the
results of Experiment 2 indicate that goal neglect is one of the
underlying mechanisms of the truth proportion effect.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Although lying is generally considered to be more cognitively
demanding than truth telling, recent models proposed that
the cognitive cost of lying is influenced by contextual factors.
In order to fully develop a cognitive approach to lying and
lie-detection, these contextual factors need to be uncovered.
Recent studies have shown that the cognitive cost of deception
depends on the proportion of lie/truth-trials (Verschuere et al.,
2011; Van Bockstaele et al., 2012). In the present study, we
examined whether this truth proportion effect is driven by task
switching (Experiment 1) and/or goal neglect (Experiment 2).
When controlling for switch costs, the truth proportion effect
disappeared in the RT data but was still maintained in the error
data. Manipulating goal neglect had strong effects on the truth
proportion effect: When goal neglect was reduced, the truth
proportion effect also diminished, while the truth proportion
effect was left intact when goal neglect was not reduced. This was
especially the case in the RT data and only marginally so in the
error data. Taken together, our findings suggest that the original
truth proportion effect may be partially driven by switch costs
and is most likely influenced by goal neglect.
The replication of the original truth proportion effect in
the error data of Experiment 1 and in the non-cued trials of
Experiment 2 further adds to the idea that lying is not always
more cognitively demanding than truth telling (McCornack et al.,
2014; Walczyk et al., 2014; Vrij, 2015), as in these conditions
there was no significant lie-effect in the frequent-lie group. As
such, lying may be just as easy or difficult as truth telling when
people lie frequently or when lies are well-practiced, although
it should also be noted that we found no evidence for the idea
that deceptive responding can be easier than truthful responding.
This finding has important implications for the detection of
deception. On the one hand, it suggests that people can train
themselves to become practiced liars who will experience little if
any difficulty when responding deceptively, which would most
often lead to inconclusive (but not false negative) results on RT-
based lie-detection tests. On the other hand, it implies that lie
detection may be improved by asking suspects a large majority
of verifiable questions on which they have to respond truthfully,
hence increasing the cognitive cost of deception on a minority of
critical incriminating questions.
A limitation of this approach concerns the generalizability of
these findings to new items and new settings. Van Bockstaele et al.
(2012) showed that responding deceptively in general was more
difficult while participants were more often responding truthfully
(i.e., in the training phase), yet it only remained more difficult
for those specific items on which participants always responded
truthfully in the training phase. As we used the same items for
filler and test trials in Experiment 2, it is possible that these
findings were item-specific and will not necessarily generalize
to new items. Nevertheless, our results indicate that introducing
a relatively higher number of truth-trials adds to the list of
cognitive load manipulations that may improve the detection of
liars. Vrij et al. (2011), for instance, proposed that creating task
demands that increase cognitive load (e.g., by asking suspects
to tell their story in reversed order) will make the interview
more difficult, especially so for lying suspects. In a similar vein,
interviewers could ask unexpected questions, for which a suspect
is unlikely to have prepared and practiced a lie (e.g., see Vrij
et al., 2009). In contrast to many deception studies that proposed
cognitive load manipulations without exploring their underlying
mechanisms, the current study highlights switch costs and goal
neglect as potential drivers of the truth proportion effect. Such a
process-oriented investigation validates the use of this cognitive
manipulation for lie detection purposes and enhances further
theoretical understanding of deception.
An interesting issue concerns how our findings of proportion
effects in deception tasks relate to the literature on cognitive
control and the resolution of conflict. In the Sheffield lie test,
there is a conflict between truthful and deceptive responding,
leading to the general lie-effect. In a similar vein, people
experience conflict in the Stroop task, where they are required
to respond to the ink-color of color-words, the flanker task
(Eriksen and Eriksen, 1974), where a central target is flanked
by task-relevant distracters (e.g., > > < > >), or the Simon
task (Simon and Rudell, 1967), where participants respond with
right or left button presses based on for instance the color of
targets that are presented on the right or left side of the screen.
These conflict tasks have all been shown to be influenced by
congruency proportion effects (Bugg and Crump, 2012). For
instance, the Stroop effect (i.e., the RT for incongruent minus
congruent trials) is reduced when the majority of the trials are
incongruent (e.g., the word BLUE printed in red), and it is
increased when the majority of the trials is congruent (i.e., the
word RED printed in red). Traditionally, such proportion effects
have been explained by the conflict adaptation hypothesis (e.g.,
Botvinick et al., 2001). This hypothesis assumes that participants
detect and use the congruency proportion, leading them to pay
more (vs. less) attention to the meaning of the words rather than
their color in the condition with mostly congruent (vs. mostly
incongruent) trials. Schmidt (2013) formulated an alternative,
bottom-up idea. According to his contingency hypothesis, people
use the identity of the stimulus to predict which response is
most likely to be appropriate. If trials are mostly congruent, the
identity of the word BLUE predicts that the correct response is
most likely “blue.” If most trials are incongruent, the identity
of the word BLUE predicts that the correct response is unlikely
“blue,” but rather another color. In the context of our deception
experiments (Verschuere et al., 2011; Van Bockstaele et al.,
2012, Experiment 1 of the current study), the contingency
account cannot fully explain the truth proportion effect. In
these experiments, the truth proportion was manipulated by an
independent set of filler trials, and the lie-effect was calculated
for the test trials only. For the test trials, the contingency between
the stimuli and the responses did not vary with truth proportion
condition. Hence, participants could not use individual stimuli
to predict whether the most likely task would be to respond
deceptively or responding truthfully. An explanation in terms of
conflict adaptation may therefore be more likely to explain the
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truth proportion effect. In the high truth proportion condition,
participants may have noticed that their automatic response
(i.e., the truth) mostly resulted in the correct response, and
hence decided to “follow their gut.” In the low truth proportion
condition, the automatic truth response mostly conflicted with
the required deceptive response, and hence participants may have
changed gears and performed the task in a slower, more strategic
fashion.
Another issue concerns possible alternative explanations for
the truth proportion effect, besides differences in task switching
and goal neglect. One such alternative that we did not investigate
in this study is the oddball-effect (e.g., see Squires et al., 1975;
Stevens et al., 2000; Goldstein et al., 2002). In oddball tasks,
participants respond to one highly frequent and one less frequent
type of stimulus. Responses for the frequent stimuli are typically
very fast, while responses for the infrequent stimuli are usually
slower. In experiments using truth proportion manipulations,
lie-trials are more frequent than truth-trials for participants in
the frequent-lie group. As such, these participants should be
more likely to respond fast on lie-trials and slow on truth-trials,
resulting in a decreased lie-effect. Inversely, in a frequent-truth
group, there are more truth-trials than lie-trials, resulting in
faster responses on truth-trials compared to lie-trials, and thus
a larger lie-effect. In order to investigate whether the oddball-
effect also adds to the truth proportion effect, one could compare
the lie-effects of crucial trials in sequences of filler trials. For
instance, one could present the sequence Lf-Tf-Tf-Tf-Tc-Lc and
the sequence Tf-Tf-Lf-Tf-Tc-Lc, in which L stands for lie-trial, T
stands for truth-trial, c stands for crucial trial, and f stands for
filler-trial. In both cases the proportion of lie- and truth-trials is
the same. However, Lc in the first sequence is more of an oddball
as Lc in the second sequence, as it is preceded by four consecutive
truth-trials, compared to only two consecutive truth-trials in the
second sequence. Hence, if the oddball effect adds to the truth
proportion effect, the lie-effect (Lc minus Tc) should be larger in
the first sequence than in the second sequence.
Our study is not without limitations. For instance, we did
not include manipulation checks for our goal neglect induction.
Another limitation concerns the ecological validity of our
study. In our deception paradigm, participants were instructed
to respond deceptively or truthfully on relatively simple yes-
no questions by pressing one of two response buttons. This
controlled set-up allowed us to manipulate and address the
influence of task switching and goal neglect on the truth
proportion effect. However, in more realistic settings, lying often
involves the choice regarding whether or not, and how, to
generate a message that manipulates truthful information, as
well as social interactions, more complex stories, large gains or
losses, andmore emotional involvement and arousal. These more
realistic circumstances differ from the binary yes/no responding
in our study. Consequently, it remains to be seen whether the
implications of our study also generalize tomore complex applied
settings, such as interviews or lie detection tests, in which people
are typically faced with open-ended questions that require more
elaborate responses and more cognitive effort.
Another limitation is inherent to our goal neglect
manipulation. Whereas Parris et al. (2012) used general cues
(e.g., “fast” or “quick”) to prime task goals, our cues were more
specific in the sense that they predicted whether participants
would be responding deceptively vs. responding truthfully on
the following trial. Because the cues were informative of the
task, our goal maintenance manipulation may have also had
an effect on task switch costs. Switch costs are typically smaller
when participants have more time to prepare the next task
(i.e., when the Cue-Stimulus Interval is long; Meiran, 1996).
On cued trials, the task cue was presented for 1 s before the
stimulus sentence was presented, thus allowing participants
to prepare the upcoming task. On non-cued trials, there was
no such task cue, and participants only knew which task to
perform upon seeing the (color of the) stimulus sentence.
Furthermore, the amount of information that is presented in
cues also influences switch costs (Miyake et al., 2004). Explicit
cues such as ours (i.e., “Lie” and “Truth”) typically result in
smaller switch costs compared to more arbitrary cues (e.g.,
“X” as a cue for responding deceptively and Y as a cue for
responding truthfully). Our goal maintenance manipulation
may thus have been confounded with differences in switch costs.
However, the results of Experiment 1—in which we explicitly
controlled for switch costs—showed that task switching likely
has only a limited impact on the truth proportion effect, as
the truth proportion effect remained intact in the error rates.
Nevertheless, it seems worthwhile to replicate the present study
using cues that are not informative of the task to manipulate goal
neglect.
In sum, the replication of the standard lie-effect advocates the
use of cognitive lie detection tests. The replication of the truth
proportion effect confirms that the cognitive cost of deception
is influenced by the frequency of deception. This implies that
well-trained lies may be hard to differentiate from the truth, but
also that lie detection tests can be improved by adding a large
number of truth-items. Finally, the present experiments indicate
that the truth proportion effect is likely in large part driven by
goal neglect, while task switching only has a smaller influence on
the truth proportion effect.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
BVB is funded by the Research Priority Area YIELD of the
University of Amsterdam. ED is an honorary post-doctoral fellow
at Ghent University. The authors wish to thank Milou Bedijn for
collecting the data of Experiment 2.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
The Supplementary Material for this article can be found
online at: http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.
2015.01666
Data Availability Statement
The original data that were used in Experiment 1 and
Experiment 2 are accessible via the following link to the
Open Science Framework data deposit: https://osf.io/qgsv3/?
view_only=32cb9693d1b94507a5ba2952a8fe9435.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 8 November 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1666
Van Bockstaele et al. When deception becomes easy
REFERENCES
Blandón-Gitlin, I., Fenn, E., Masip, J., and Yoo, A. H. (2014). Cognitive-load
approaches to detect deception: searching for cognitive mechanisms. Trends
Cogn. Sci. 18, 441–444. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2014.05.004
Botvinick, M. M., Braver, T. S., Barch, D. M., Carter, C. S., and Cohen, J. D. (2001).
Conflict monitoring and cognitive control. Psychol. Rev. 108, 624–652. doi:
10.1037/0033-295X.108.3.624
Bugg, J. M., and Crump, M. J. C. (2012). In support of a distinction between
voluntary and stimulus-driven control: a review of the literature on proportion
congruent effects. Front. Psychol. 3:367. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00367
Christ, S. E., van Essen, D. C., Watson, J. M., Brubaker, L. E., and McDermott,
K. B. (2009). The contributions of prefrontal cortex and executive control to
deception: evidence from activation likelihood estimate meta-analysis. Cereb.
Cortex 19, 1557–1566. doi: 10.1093/cercor/bhn189
Cohen, J. (1992). A power primer. Psychol. Bull. 112, 155–159. doi: 10.1037/0033-
2909.112.1.155
Debey, E., Verschuere, B., and Crombez, G. (2012). Lying and executive control: an
experimental investigation using ego depletion and goal neglect. Acta Psychol.
140, 133–141. doi: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2012.03.004
De Jong, R., Berendsen, E., and Cools, R. (1999). Goal neglect and inhibitory
limitations: dissociable causes of interference effects in conflict situations. Acta
Psychol. 101, 379–394. doi: 10.1016/S0001-6918(99)00012-8
Duncan, J. (1995). “Attention, intelligence, and the frontal lobes,” in The Cognitive
Neurosciences, ed M. S. Gazzaniga (Cambridge: MIT Press), 721–733.
Eriksen, B. A., and Eriksen, C. W. (1974). Effects of noise letters upon the
identification of a target letter in a nonsearch task. Percept. Psychophys. 16,
143–149. doi: 10.3758/BF03203267
Farah, M. J., Hutchinson, J. B., Phelps, E. A., andWagner, A. D. (2014). Functional
MRI-based lie detection: scientific and societal challenges. Nat. Rev. Neurosci.
15, 123–131. doi: 10.1038/nrn3665
Gamer, M. (2014). Mind reading using neuroimaging: is this the future
of deception detection? Eur. Psychol. 19, 172–183. doi: 10.1027/1016-
9040/a000193
Goldstein, A., Spencer, K. M., and Donchin, E. (2002). The influence of stimulus
deviance and novelty on the P300 and novelty P3. Psychophysiology 39,
781–790. doi: 10.1111/1469-8986.3960781
Gombos, V. A. (2006). The cognition of deception: the role of executive processes
in producing lies. Genet. Soc. Gen. Psychol. Monogr. 132, 197–214. doi:
10.3200/MONO.132.3.197-214
Hu, X., Chen, H., and Fu, G. (2012). A repeated lie becomes a truth? The effect
of intentional control and training on deception. Front. Psychol. 3:488. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00488
Inquisit 3 (2010). Inquisit 3.0.4.0 [Computer software]. Seattle, WA: Millisecond
Software LLC.
Johnson, R. Jr., Barnhardt, J., and Zhu, J. (2005). Differential effects of practice
on the executive processes used for truthful and deceptive responses: an
event-related brain potential study. Cogn. Brain Res. 24, 386–404. doi:
10.1016/j.cogbrainres.2005.02.011
Lie. (2015). In Merriam-Webster.com. Available online at: http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/lie. [Retrived: September 11, 2015].
McCornack, S., Morrison, K., Paik, J. E., Wisner, A. M., and Zhu, X.
(2014). Information manipulation theory 2: a propositional theory of
deceptive discourse production. J. Lang. Soc. Psychol. 33, 348–377. doi:
10.1177/0261927X14534656
Meiran, N. (1996). Reconfiguration of processing mode prior to task performance.
J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 22, 1423–1442. doi: 10.1037/0278-
7393.22.6.1423
Miyake, A., Emerson, M. J., Padilla, F., and Ahn, J. C. (2004). Inner speech
as a retrieval aid for task goals: the effects of cue type and articulatory
suppression in the random task cuing paradigm. Acta Psychol. 115, 123–142.
doi: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2003.12.004
Monsell, S. (2003). Task switching. Trends Cogn. Sci. 7, 134–140. doi:
10.1016/S1364-6613(03)00028-7
Parris, B. A., Bate, S., Brown, S. D., and Hodgson, T. L. (2012). Facilitating goal-
oriented behaviour in the Stroop task: when executive control is influenced by
automatic processing. PLoS ONE 7:e46994. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0046994
Schmidt, J. R. (2013). Questioning conflict adaptation: proportion congruent
and Gratton effects reconsidered. Psychon. Bull. Rev. 20, 615–630. doi:
10.3758/s13423-012-0373-0
Simon, J. R., and Rudell, A. P. (1967). Auditory S–R compatibility: the effect of
an irrelevant cue on information processing. J. Appl. Psychol. 51, 300–304. doi:
10.1037/h0020586
Spence, S. A., Farrow, T. F., Herford, A. E., Wilkinson, I. D., Zheng, Y., and
Woodruff, P. W., R (2001). Behavioural and functional anatomical correlates
deception in humans. Neuroreport 12, 2849–2853. doi: 10.1097/00001756-
200109170-00019
Squires, N. K., Squires, K. C., and Hillyard, S. A. (1975). Two varieties of
long-latency positive waves evoked by unpredictable auditory stimuli in
man. Electroencephalogr. Clin. Neurophysiol. 38, 387–401. doi: 10.1016/0013-
4694(75)90263-1
Stevens, A. A., Skudlarski, P., Gatenby, J. C., and Gore, J. C. (2000). Event-related
fMRI of auditory and visual oddball tasks. Magn. Reson. Imaging 18, 495–502.
doi: 10.1016/S0730-725X(00)00128-4
Stroop, J. R. (1935). Studies on interference in serial verbal reactions. J. Exp.
Psychol. 18, 643–662. doi: 10.1037/h0054651
Van Bockstaele, B., Verschuere, B., Moens, T., Suchotzki, K., Debey, E., and Spruyt,
A. (2012). Learning to lie: effects of practice on the cognitive cost of lying. Front.
Psychol. 3:526. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00526
Vandierendonck, A., Liefooghe, B., and Verbruggen, F. (2010). Task switching:
interplay of reconfiguration and interference control. Psychol. Bull. 136,
601–626. doi: 10.1037/a0019791
Vendemia, J.M. C., Buzan, R. F., andGreen, E. P. (2005). Practice effects, workload,
and reaction time in deception. Am. J. Psychol. 118, 413–429.
Verschuere, B., Spruyt, A., Meijer, E. H., and Otgaar, H. (2011). The ease of lying.
Conscious. Cogn. 20, 908–911. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2010.10.023
Verschuere, B., Suchotzki, K., and Debey, E. (2014). “Detecting deception
through reaction times,” in Deception Detection: Current Challenges
and New Approaches, eds P. A. Granhag, A. Vrij, and B. Verschuere
(Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd), 269–291. doi: 10.1002/9781118510
001.ch12
Vrij, A. (2015). “A cognitive approach to lie detection,” in Detecting Deception:
Current Challenges and Cognitive Approaches, eds P. A. Granhag, A. Vrij, and
B. Verschuere (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd), 203–229.
Vrij, A., Fisher, R., Mann, S., and Leal, S. (2006). Detecting deception
by manipulating cognitive load. Trends Cogn. Sci. 10, 141–142. doi:
10.1016/j.tics.2006.02.003
Vrij, A., Granhag, P. A., Mann, S., and Leal, S. (2011). Outsmarting the liars:
toward a cognitive lie detection approach. Psychol. Sci. 20, 28–32. doi:
10.1177/0963721410391245
Vrij, A., Leal, S., Granhag, P. A., Mann, S., Fisher, R. P., Hillman, J.,
et al. (2009). Outsmarting the liars: the benefit of asking unanticipated
questions. Law Hum. Behav. 33, 159–166. doi: 10.1007/s10979-008-
9143-y
Walczyk, J. J., Harris, L. L., Duck, T. K., and Mulay, D. (2014). A
social-cognitive framework for understanding serious lies: activation-
decision-construction-action theory. New Ideas Psychol. 34, 22–36. doi:
10.1016/j.newideapsych.2014.03.001
Walczyk, J. J., Igou, F. P., Dixon, A. P., and Tcholakian, T. (2013). Advancing lie
detection by inducing cognitive load on liars: a review of relevant theories and
techniques guided by lessons from polygraph-based approaches. Front. Psychol.
4:14. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00014
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2015 Van Bockstaele, Wilhelm, Meijer, Debey and Verschuere. This
is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums
is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the
original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic
practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply
with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 9 November 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1666
